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Defendant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County (California) that convicted him of attempted robbery and first-degree felony murder, arguing that a standing crop, as realty, could not be the subject of a robbery and that application of felony-murder rule constituted a deprivation of due process of law.

While attempting to steal marijuana growing on another's land, defendant was discovered by the landowner, who carried a shotgun. Fearing that he would be shot, defendant shot first, killing the landowner. He appealed his conviction of attempted robbery and first-degree felony murder, arguing that a standing crop of marijuana could not be the subject of a robbery because it was realty, not personalty, and that the felony-murder rule violated due process requirements. In affirming the attempted robbery conviction, the appellate lawyers business concluded that a robbery within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 211 was committed when property affixed to realty was severed and removed. Thus, defendant was properly convicted of attempting to commit such a robbery. In modifying the judgment by reducing the crime to second-degree murder, however, the appellate court concluded that, where defendant was unusually immature and his act was in response to a perceived threat, the life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Nevertheless, because defendant intentionally killed the victim without legally adequate provocation, he could be and ought to be punished for second-degree murder

The judgment convicting defendant of attempted robbery was affirmed. A standing crop, once severed from realty, was property that could be the subject of a robbery or an attempted robbery. The judgment convicting defendant of first-degree felony murder was modified to reflect a conviction of murder in the second degree where the mandatory punishment imposed under the former conviction constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

A jury of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, convicted defendant, an unlicensed student midwife, of practicing medicine without certification, a felony, in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2052, subd. (a), after she provided prenatal care to a pregnant woman and attended the labor and delivery without supervision. Defendant appealed.

The court of appeal held that defendant could properly be convicted for practicing medicine without certification, and not only for a misdemeanor violation of the Licensed Midwifery Practice Act of 1993, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2505 et seq. The Williamson rule (that a special act will be considered as an exception to a general statute) did not apply because the general and specific statutes did not overlap. The Midwifery Act did not shield a midwife, licensed or unlicensed, from prosecution for practicing medicine without certification, and none of the elements of the general statute corresponded to those of the special statute. Defendant may have committed a misdemeanor violation of the Midwifery Act by performing midwife services without the required supervision of a licensed midwife or a physician and surgeon, but she also did a great deal more than that. Her conduct above and beyond the failure to secure supervision constituted practicing medicine without certification, a felony violation of the general statute.

The court affirmed the judgment.

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Created on Mar 23rd 2021 02:16. Viewed 109 times.

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