EEOC lawyer

Cross-appeals were taken from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which, in two consolidated cases, declared that plaintiff counties were entitled to reimbursement under Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, for state-mandated costs and granted mandate relief under Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, requiring defendant, the State of California, to pay the counties over a 15-year period.

The counties sought payment from numerous state agencies. The court held that the writ of mandate violated the separation of powers doctrine in Cal. Const., art. III, § 3 because the power to make appropriations as set forth in Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 7, and Cal. Const., art. IV, §§ 10, 12, was not a judicial power. The Legislature could not be judicially compelled to appropriate sufficient funds to satisfy the State's reimbursement obligations to the counties. Moreover, the EEOC lawyer counties had an adequate remedy under Gov. Code, § 17617. Although it could be said that the State generally had a ministerial duty to reimburse local agencies for state-mandated programs and services, the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion when it declined to order prompt payment because of the complexity of the claims. Section 17617 did not impair a contractual right to reimbursement because Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, did not create such a right. A monetary award was improper as declaratory relief under Code Civ. Proc., § 1060, because there was no actual controversy as to the State's obligation to pay, and monetary damages were not available for a violation of Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6.

The court reversed and remanded with directions to the superior court to vacate the peremptory writ of mandate and to enter a judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate.

Defendant tenant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Santa Clara County (California), which denied his Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, anti-SLAPP motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff landlord's claims for breach of a residential lease agreement, breach of the implied covenant of good faith in the lease agreement, inducing prospective buyers to breach their purchase contract with the landlord, and other causes of action.

The landlord wanted to show the house to prospective buyers before the tenant vacated it. The tenant asked the landlord to waive the last month's rent. The landlord refused to do so. The tenant told the prospective buyers' agent that a registered sex offender lived across the street. The prospective buyers refused to sign a disclosure statement about the offender and declined to buy the house. The court held that the tenant's statement qualified for anti-SLAPP protection under § 425.16, subd. (e)(4), because it was made in connection with an issue of public interest. Pen. Code, §§ 290, subd. (a), 290.03, subd. (a), and Civ. Code, § 2079.10a, reflected a strong and widespread public interest in knowing the location of registered sex offenders. The illegal conduct exception to anti-SLAPP protection did not apply because the offender's location was not a secret as defined in Pen. Code, § 519; thus, the tenant could not have committed attempted extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 524. The absence of an identified person at risk did not make the disclosure of the offender's location a violation of Pen. Code, § 290.46; moreover, such a violation would not preclude anti-SLAPP protection.

The court reversed the order and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.